CIAO DATE: 05/2014
Volume: 4, Issue: 4
March 2014
Egypt in Transition: The Third Republic (PDF)
M. Cherif Bassiouni
O n January 25, 2011, the Egyptian people took to the streets and in 18 days were able to bring down the 30-year corrupt dictatorial regime of Hosni Mubarak, using entirely peaceful means. That revolution set the Arab Republic of Egypt on a hopeful path to democracy. After Mubarak resigned, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) became the custodian of the transition. In June of 2012, in Egypt’s first free and fair presidential election, Muslim Brotherhood candidate Mohammed Morsi was elected President. Slightly more than 50 percent of registered voters actually voted, and those voters gave Morsi a majority of just less than 52 percent. Having won by this slim margin, Morsi was sworn in as President on June 30, 2012, and thus the Second Republic came to be.1 He was removed by the military on July 3, 2013 and a temporary President, Adly Mansour, was appointed on July 4, 2013. Thus began the Third Republic.
Talking to the Taliban 2010 – 2011: A Reflection (PDF)
Marc Grossman
W hen then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton asked in early 2011 if I would become the United States’ Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP) – after the sudden death of Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, the first SRAP – she described the foundations Ambassador Holbrooke had laid to manage one of the most challenging tasks facing the nation. Secretary Clinton also said that she wanted to continue the experiment: having the SRAP organization prove that the “whole-of-government” philosophy – the idea that the United States must employ expertise and resources from all relevant parts of government to address the nation’s most important challenges – was the right model for 21st century diplomacy.2 The SRAP team brought together experts from across the U.S. Government (and included several diplomats from NATO countries) to develop and implement integrated strategies to address the complex challenges in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the region. Among the first things I learned when I arrived at my desk in February 2011, was that an allied government had put the United States in contact with someone who seemed to be an empowered representative of the Taliban, the Afghan insurgent group which the United States had removed from power in 2001, but which had ever since kept up a deadly war against Afghans, Americans and our allies, friends and partners.3 The contact was preliminary, but many in the White House and on the SRAP team hoped that this connection might open the door for the conversation everyone knew would be required if there were ever to be peace in Afghanistan: Afghans talking to other Afghans about the future of Afghanistan. Such direct talk had so far proven impossible because the Taliban refused to meet representatives of the government of Afghanistan. The intriguing opportunity offered by a direct U.S. conversation with the Taliban was that we might be able to create the context for the Afghan government and the Taliban to talk.
Strategic Terrorism: A Call to Action (PDF)
Nathan P. Myhrvold
T echnology contains no inherent moral directive—it empowers people, whatever their intent, good or evil. This has always been true: when bronze implements supplanted those made of stone, the ancient world got scythes and awls, but also swords and battle-axes. The novelty of our present situation is that modern technology can provide small groups of people with much greater lethality than ever before. We now have to worry that private parties might gain access to weapons that are as destructive as—or possibly even more destructive than— those held by any nation-state. A handful of people, perhaps even a single individual, could have the ability to kill millions or even billions. Indeed, it is possible, from a technological standpoint, to kill every man, woman, and child on earth. The gravity of the situation is so extreme that getting the concept across without seeming silly or alarmist is challenging. Just thinking about the subject with any degree of seriousness numbs the mind. The goal of this essay is to present the case for making the needed changes before such a catastrophe occurs. The issues described here are too important to ignore.
Hybridization of Conflicts (PDF)
Alain Bauer
A t a basic level, historically wars and conflicts were easy to understand: a cause, an enemy, a war. Things seemed clear, consistent, and predictable. There was symmetry and each side had its counterpart. The enemy was able to negotiate. It was all at least somewhat straightforward, if tragic. This was the case for centuries – up until the fall of the Berlin Wall. Then in the early 1990s a nebula appeared that we Occidentals referred to as “al-Qaeda” (or more formally the “World Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and Crusaders” – less effective for marketing, but more accurate). The emergence of al-Qaeda irreversibly altered the conventional and often automatic, “terrorism / international state sponsor” analysis. Terrorists no longer had need of state sponsorship, and terrorism became de-linked from strictly nationalist motives. Terrorism evolved beyond the ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, a Basque separatist organization), the IRA (Irish Republican Army), or PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization) type of organization. France has had the misfortune to experience revolutionary terrorism since its own revolution of 1789, and indeed the term terrorism, derives from the French “terrorisme,” which was used to describe the atrocities committed by the French government during the Reign of Terror. This paper reviews the revolution in terrorism affairs since the 1960s.
Putting State Legitimacy at the Center of Foreign Operations and Assistance (PDF)
Bruce Gilley
I t is a commonly expressed idea that a key goal of intervention in and assistance to foreign nations is to establish (or re-establish) legitimate political authority. Historically, even so great a skeptic as John Stuart Mill allowed that intervention could be justified if it were “for the good of the people themselves” as measured by their willingness to support and defend the results.1 In recent times, President George W. Bush justified his post-war emphasis on democracybuilding in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere in the Middle East with the logic that “nations in the region will have greater stability because governments will have greater legitimacy.”2 President Obama applauded French intervention in Mali for its ability “to reaffirm democracy and legitimacy and an effective government” in the country.3 The experiences of Western-led state reconstruction in Cambodia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq among other places have been characterized by a belated recognition of the legitimacy imperative. In contemporary debates on a wide range of foreign intervention and assistance operations, legitimacy has come to occupy a central place in discussions of the domestic agenda of rebuilding that follows the external agenda that drives the initial intervention – stopping genocide, toppling a dictator, saving the starving, or establishing a transitional authority.
Rules of Engagement and Abusive Citizens (PDF)
Amitai Etzioni
T he time has come to draw lessons from the war in Afghanistan. One major concern is how the U.S. military ought to deal with civilians who are sporadic combatants, and civilians who act, part of the time, as support forces for combatants (by serving as intelligence agents, manufacturing ammunition and bombs, supplying provisions and transportation, and so on). Discussion of this topic has often focused on ways to deal with those civilians after they have been caught fighting us and whether they should be treated as soldiers or as criminals, a matter that has not been resolved. (My own position is that they should be treated as a third category: as terrorists, subject to distinct rules and authority.)2 This article focuses on an earlier phase: when these civilians are still acting as combatants or supporting them. This article makes the case for a major change in the basic normative precept involved and for a new Geneva Convention, both needed in order to shift the main onus of civilian casualties where it belongs: to those who engage in combat (or help those who do) without adhering to the rules of war, which require that they separate themselves from peaceful civilians. While the U.S. and its allies should do their best to minimize collateral damage, instead of accepting the basic precept that we are the main cause of civilian casualties—highlighting our mistakes, repeatedly apologizing, and seeking to make amends—we should stress that insurgents who violate the rules of war are the main source of these regrettable casualties.
A Swift and Decisive Victory: The Strategic Implications of What Victory Means (PDF)
Chong Shi Hao
T he national purpose driving the build-up of the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) to its third generation has been the deterrence of any potential adversary and achieving victory if war does break out. Because the mission statement above serves as a guide for SAF’s defense policy and also its transformation efforts, it is important to be clear about what this “victory” entails. The adjectives “swift and decisive” help to illuminate the nature of this victory that we seek to obtain. As Clausewitz puts it succinctly, “no one starts a war or rather no one in his senses ought to do so without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.” This quote sums up the concern of this essay, which aims to add clarity to what victory should look like, in light of recent events and the evolution of modern warfare. It is to help us be clear about the victory we want to achieve (i.e. what is winning?). The definition of the victory SAF aims to accomplish has to be re-examined within the context of today’s debate over the future of war. The texture and nature of this victory have obvious implications for our conduct of war – strategy, operations and tactics (i.e. how to win?) – and also how we tailor future transformation of the SAF to meet what this victory requires (how we prepare ourselves to win?). One of the main issues here is that as warfare evolves, our notion of victory must adapt accordingly. Most
Evolving Internal Roles of the Armed Forces: Lessons for Building Partner Capacity (PDF)
Albrecht Schnabel, Marc Krupanski
T he end of the Cold War more than two decades ago created new international realities, along with hopes and expectations for greater peace and stability worldwide. Part of that peace dividend was expected to be the result of a decrease in defense spending, with direct consequences for the size and functions of nations’ armed forces. As a result, in parts of the world that benefited from increased security, the changing security challenges and interpretations of what should be considered suitable tasks and roles of armed forces have led to “profound … shifts in their core roles … (which are) … increasingly challenging long-held assumptions about what armed forces are for and how they should be structured and organized”.2 Governments and societies have been contemplating the appropriateness of newly defined or previously secondary purposes for their armed forces, which extend beyond their core role of national defense. These include the assignment of a variety of external and internal military and civilian roles and tasks. Some of these are performed as a subsidiary activity in support of operations under civilian command. An examination of the internal roles of the armed forces in 15 Western democracies shows that armed forces assist in internal security provision mainly as a resource of last resort when efforts are required to respond to exceptional situations. This is the case primarily during and after natural and humanitarian catastrophes as well as other emergencies that exceed the response capacities of civilian and hybrid security institutions. Under the command and control of civilian agencies, the usually subsidiary operations of the armed forces are designed to enhance the capacity of civilian security providers in such situations.3 What does this mean for armed forces in the developing countries in their indigenous state-building
Sri Lanka's National Security (PDF)
Gotabhaya Rajapaksa
S ri Lanka is one of the most peaceful and stable countries in the world today. Its citizens enjoy the benefits of peace and have complete freedom and countless opportunities to build better futures for themselves. At the same time, Sri Lanka faces potential threats from various sources. Guarding against these threats and ensuring the safety of the nation is the first duty of the government, because national security is the foundation of freedom and prosperity. As such, the government needs to be fully aware of all the issues that impact the country in areas such as defense, foreign policy, economic affairs and internal law and order. It must formulate a comprehensive national security strategy to deal with them. A viable national security strategy must constantly align ends with means, goals with resources, and objectives with the tools required to accomplish them. The strategy needs to be aligned with the aspirations of the people, and it must have public support. Ideally, if comprehensive security is to be ensured, it requires the achievement of national cohesion, political and economic stability, the elimination of terrorism, the countering of extremism, and the formulation of effective responses to external challenges. The government must make every effort to keep aware of a continually changing situation and take appropriate action in response to new developments and challenges. It is only then that the safety of the nation can be assured.
Confronting the Threat of Corruption (PDF)
Tim Sullivan, Carl Forsberg
A s the conflict in Afghanistan has evolved over the last decade, it has become apparent that of the many challenges the country and its international partners face, few are as complex, pervasive, and threatening as corruption and organized crime. Together, corruption and organized crime have undermined efforts to build Afghan institutions, consolidate security gains, achieve political progress, encourage economic growth, and set conditions for enduring stability. These problems, however, are not unique to the war in Afghanistan. Conflicts elsewhere in recent decades have revealed that states engaged in or emerging from insurgencies and civil wars—especially those in which institutions are weak, rule of law is minimal, and substantial international resources have been injected with inadequate oversight—are particularly susceptible to the proliferation of corruption and organized crime. The Afghan experience is rich with lessons for the American military and foreign policy establishment as it considers the likely nature of future armed conflict. In the years ahead, the U.S. may again be compelled to assist or intervene in weak states experiencing protracted instability or rebuilding after years of violence. In such environments—as in Afghanistan— there is a pressing requirement not only for seamless integration of civilian and military efforts to establish security, enable law enforcement organizations, and promote the rule of law, but also for full coordination in the pursuit of transparency and accountability within the critical institutions of
Women and Wars (PDF)
Kristen A. Cordell
C arol Cohn’s December 2012 anthology Women and Wars uses descriptions of the varied roles of women during conflict to push forward an agenda for full inclusion of their perspective in securing the peace. Women and Wars fills the vacuum left by the “women as victims” approach that characterized the early 2000’s, with a diverse array of options for understanding the roles and perspectives that women have during conflict, including: soldiers, civilians, caregivers, sex workers, refugees and internally displaced persons, anti-war activists, and community peacebuilders. Over the last two years the expansion of information on women, peace, and security has been vast both within academia and policy circles. The space once characterized by “awkward silences,”1 between feminist researchers and security practitioners is closing rapidly – assisted by an improved understanding of why gender matters during conflict and post conflict. During the preparation of the 2011 U.S.
The End of Power (PDF)
Amy Zalman
The title of Moises Naim’s newest book is an apt summary of its basic thesis. The End of Power: From Boardrooms to Battlefields and Churches to States, Why Being in Charge Isn’t What it Used to Be is about exactly that: how the large institutions and bureaucracies that have controlled territory, ideology and wealth for the last several hundred years have been compelled to cede this control to numerous smaller players. Although the book reviews a number of definitions of power, its consistent focus is on how institutional power in the modern period came to be defined in terms of size and scope. In modern times, the bigger you are, the more powerful you are. When Naim says that power is decaying - the book’s battle cry - he means that our mainstream definition of power as bigness no longer holds true.
An Interview with Lieutenant General Mike Flynn (PDF)
In 2010 you co-authored an article “Fixing Intel;” what was wrong with intel when you wrote that article? Flynn: When I looked at the intelligence system, as the Chief Intelligence Officer for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and U.S. Forces Afghanistan in 2009, I realized that for us to be successful with President Obama’s new population-centric strategy we had to refocus on the right aspects of the environment. We were focused to a large degree – I would say 95 percent – on the enemy networks (e.g. Taliban, the Haqqani Network, etc.). We had tremendous fidelity on those issues because we had been studying them for years. What we quickly realized was that we had no knowledge, no real understanding of the various tribal elements within Afghanistan. We had to understand the cultures that existed, the dynamics of the type of government that we were trying to support and the population centers in which we were actually operating. We honestly did not have any deep understanding of any of that. We were trying to figure out who was who, from the local governments on up to the national government, and we did not have any captured data, information or knowledge. We did not have that real depth of understanding that we had in other places – in Iraq it took us a while to get there. Those conditions led me and two colleagues to sit down and put our thoughts together to say we needed to do something different. We needed to completely realign our focus to the population and to the build out of the Afghan National Security Forces. We outlined the color system: the red, the white, the green, and the blue. The red was the enemy; white was the population; green was Afghan National Security Forces; and blue was us. We had a really good picture of the red and the blue, but we had no picture of the green or the white, and it was really stunning. So, we decided to put our thoughts down on paper.